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Statement of Interest and Identification of Amici Curiae

Amicus Curiae, the Utah Alliance to Protect Property Rights (Alliance),
submits this brief to provide the court additional legal and practical context in
which to evaluate the parties' arguments concerning whether HB 141 is
constitutional. The Alliance is a non-profit organization that represents the
interests of landowners whose property is affected by the operation of HB 141.
Its members are dedicated to increasing public awareness of private property
rights, including water rights and the rights incident to private ownership of
stream beds. The Alliance provides legal support and assistance to landowners
in cases where legal issues may have a broad impact on property rights. It also
encourages and supports the enactment of laws that secure property rights.
One representative member of the Alliance is the Utah Farm Bureau
Federation, which was formed in 1916 to protect, promote, and assert business,
economic, social, and educational interests of farming and ranching families.
Today, many of the more than 28,000 Utah Farm Bureau Federation members
hold title to lands adjacent to water bodies, including the beds under nonnavigable water bodies, in both rural and urban areas. Other members of the
Alliance include families with recreational property, agricultural property, or
residences adjacent to rivers, streams, or lakes. Alliance members also include
recreational anglers who support a balanced approach to legislative control of
property rights and public access to waterways.

1

The Alliance contends that HB 141 was a valid exercise of legislative
authority to regulate the use of state assets and supports Victory Ranch
Acquisitions (VRA) in its appeal of the Hon. Derek A. Pullan's judgment
declaring unconstitutional certain sections of the Public Waters Access Act, Utah
Code sections 73-29-101 et seq.
Statement of the Issues

The Alliance adopts the statement of issues and standards of review as
well as the statement of the case and statement of facts submitted by Appellant
VRA.
Summary of the Argument

Based on the history of water rights and their regulation in Utah, HB 141
represents a valid exercise of the legislature's authority to balance public and
private interests in the use of public resources.
The district court ruled that the public has a constitutional right to access
private beds of non-navigable public waters for recreational purposes under
article XVII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.l The district court's conclusion is
contrary to the text and history of that provision. It was intended simply to
assure that the owners of pre-statehood water rights would not lose those rights
at statehood. The district court's conclusion is also inconsistent with Conatser v.

That section provides that "[a]ll existing rights to the use of any waters in
this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and
confirmed." Utah Const. art. XVII, § 1.
I

2

Johnson, 2008 UT 48, 194 P.3d 897, in which this court referred to the public's

right to access waters for recreation as grounded in statute (Conatser easement).
Having found a constitutional basis for the Conatser easement, and
concluded that the easement was public trust property protected by article XX,
section 1, the district court proceeded to determine if a disposition whether the
trust property had been" disposed of," and, if so, whether it was a breach of
trust. 2 Rather than applying the common public trust analysis of Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), which this court adopted in Coleman v.
Utah State Land Bd. 795 P.2d 622, 635-36 (Utah 1990), the district court created a

new public trust analysis. That analytical model includes a new interpretation of
article XX, section 1' s threshold requirement that trust property be "disposed of"
before a breach can be found. Under the district court's definition, trust property
is "disposed of" when it is merely regulated by the state.
Concluding that the Conatser easement was "regulated" by HB 141, the
district court applied to that regulation a second part of its Utah public trust
analysis, a multifactorial balancing test which subjected HB 141 to a reasonable
ends and means analysis. As a consequence, it found HB 141 unconstitutional. In
2 "All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter be granted to the
State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any
person or corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted,
and, except as provided in Section 2 of the Article, are declared to be the public
lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as
may be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been or
may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired." UTAH CONST. art. XX,
§ 1.

3
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the processf the district court created a test that exposes every legislative
regulation of public lands to judicial review under its new public trust analysis.
The ruling would hobble the ability of the state to manage public assets and
encourage litigation over every effort to do so.
The Alliance joins VRA in asking this court to reverse the district courf s
ruling that HB 141 is unconstitutional.
Argument
1.

The public's right to use the private beds of public waters is a recent
judicial creation grounded on a legislative action; HB 141 permissibly
alters the balance struck by this court's decisions
At the time Utah became a statef disputes over water did not consider

recreational uses. Ratherf they centered on competing productive uses for
irrigationf watering animalsf miningf and industry. During the constitutional
convention in 1895, farmers expressed concern that when ownership of the
public waters would be transferred from the United States to Utah upon
statehoodf their private rights to use their appropriated water might be
extinguished. In responsef the constitutional convention inserted Article XVII,
Section 1. It statesf "All existing rights to the use of any waters in this State for
any useful or beneficial purposef are hereby recognized and confirmed." UTAH
CONST. art. XVII,§ 1. Not until1903 did the Utah Legislature statutorily
recognize public ownership of waters in what would become the predecessor to

4

Utah Code section 73-1-1. See 1903 Laws of Utah, Ch. 100, Sec. 47. Nothing in the
Utah Constitution spoke to it.
In 1971 the legislature amended Utah Code section 73-3-8 to require the
State Engineer to broaden the factors considered in analyzing possible claims of
interference with beneficial uses to include the recreational use of water.3 Based
upon the 1971 amendment, this court, in 1982, created the public's right to the
recreational use of public waters in J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982).
The court acknowledged this sixteen years later in Conatser v. Johnson, when it
stated that we "established our own rule that the public has 'the right to float
leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that
water."' 2008 UT 48, ,-r14, 194 P.3d 897 (quoting J.J.N.P. Co., 655 P.2d at 11361137)(emphasis added). In Conatser, the court held that the right to the
recreational water use includes "touching" privately owned beds, i.e. the
Conatser easement. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ,-r 19. The court based its holding on

3 " ... that where the state engineer, because of information in his possession
obtained either by his own investigation or otherwise, has reason to believe that
an application to appropriate water will interfere with its more beneficial use for
irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock watering, power or mining development
or manufacturing, or will unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural
stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it shall be
his duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the application until he shall
have investigated the matter." Utah Code §73-3-8 (1971) (emphasis added)
(attached as Addendum A. This was originally attached as Exhibit C to the
Alliances first brief, filed Nov. 7, 2011 (R. 535). However, it and the other two
exhibits were inadvertently omitted from the appellate record. Instead, a
separate group of exhibits, unrelated to the Alliance's amicus brief, appear to
have replaced them. SeeR. 553-628).
5
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own interpretation of the Utah Code and its prior precedent, not on the Utah
Constitution. Id. ,-r,-r 8-19.
Following Conatser, the legislature chose to address the balance struck by
this court between legislatively grounded recreational user rights and landowner
rights to the private beds of non-navigable public waters. In choosing to define
legislatively the scope of the public right to use public waters recreationally, the
legislature noted a number of problems arising after Conatser, such as
"widespread unauthorized invasion of private property for recreation purposes."
Utah Code § 73-29-103(2). In its deliberations, the legislature considered itself to
be weighing the rights of the public in public waters, under Article XX, Section 1,
and the rights of owners of private beds underlying public waters not to have
their property "taken or damaged for public use without just compensation,"
under Article I, Section 22. Recognizing that the balancing of those rights is
difficult, the legislature judged HB 141 to be a reasonable compromise on a
"difficult, intricate, and emotional topic." Recording of Utah House Floor
Debates, HB 141 First Substitute, 58th Leg., 2010 Gen. Sess. (Feb. 23, 2010)
(statement of Rep. Sheryl L. Allen). As the sponsor of the bill explained, he tried
"to draft something that truly would harmonize constitutional protections [of
private property] with trying to give as much access to the fishermen as we could
without violating those principles." Id. (statement of Rep. Kay L. Mclff).

6

HB 141 is the first Utah statute to expressly recognize the public's right to
use waters recreationally. In recognizing that right, HB 141 clarified that the
public's right to recreationally use waters that flow over private property does
not stem from that part of the Utah Code declaring public ownership of water,
i.e., the portion of the Code which was first enacted in 1903. Specifically, it states
that public ownership of water" does not create or recognize an easement for
public recreational use on private property." Utah Code§ 73-1-1(2). Instead, the
scope of that recreational right is recognized and governed by Chapter 29 of Title
73. Id. § 73-1-1(4).
HB 141 altered the scope of the right to use public waters struck by
Conatser. Id. § 73-29-103. HB 141 affirms the right to "touch" privately owned

beds under public waters to allow "safe passage and continued movement" or
"portage around a dangerous obstruction" while floating public waters. Id. § 7329-202(2). But it does not allow the public to remain on the privately owned beds
unless (i) the owner consents or (ii) the public has so used the particular bed for
at leastlO consecutive years after 1982. Id. § 73-29-201(2), -202(3), -203(1).
Otherwise, when property is fenced or posted as private, the public's recreational
use right does not include touching privately owned beds. Id. § 73-29-102(5).
The legitimacy of the legislature's concerns about the impact of Conatser is
confirmed by evidence presented to the district court in this case. This evidence
included a number of declarations documenting problems with trespassers, cut

7
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fences, and litter, as well as resulting dangers to the public.4 Randy Sessions, the
owner of property along the Weber River in Morgan County, had his fence,
which crosses the river, cut the Monday after the Conatser opinion was released.
(R.366). Larry Hays, the owner of residential property along the Millcreek stream

in Salt Lake City, experienced a surge of people fishing in his backyard after the

Conatser opinion was published. (R.375) Tim Simonsen, the owner of property
along the Provo River in Summit County, had his fences cut numerous times.
(R.371) As a result, his horses left the property and walked onto State Highway
35. (Id.) Additionally, due to cut fences, a neighbor's cows crossed onto

Simonsen's property and caused damage. (R.372) Randy James, the owner of
property on the Smith and Morehouse Creek in Summit County, dealt with
cleaning up trash and waste from trespassers who camped and started fires on
his property. (R. 368) James stated that the fence around his property is cut at
least once a year. (Id.)
The balance struck by HB 141 between the public right to the recreational
use of non-navigable public waters with the rights of owners of the private beds
beneath them is a reasonable solution reached after careful consideration of
competing interests. The legislature has not given public property to private
property owners; it has simply chosen to strike a different balance than this court
did in Conatser in administering the public's property for the benefit of all.

4 These declarations are attached at Addendum B
8
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Should experience prove adjustments are needed, the legislature can take up the
issue again, as it is uniquely equipped to do.
The district court's decision declaring parts of HB 141 unconstitutional
misconceived the basis of Conatser and overreached in attempting to formulate a
judicial remedy for what is a quintessentially legislative line drawing problem.
2.

The district court's reliance on Article XVII, Section 1 as establishing the
public's right to access public waters for recreation is contradicted by the
plain language and the history of that provision

The district court expressly declined to accept Conatser's statement that the
easement it was creating was grounded on a legislative recognition of the
recreational use of legislatively created public waters. (R. 747)5 Instead, the
district court chose to rely on general and soaring dicta from Adams v. Portage
Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co. concerning the "right of the public" to" drink or

dip ... or water his animals" in public waters as this court's operative
pronouncement on Article XVII, Section 1. 72 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah 1937). The
district court concluded that the language in Adams vouchsafed to the public all
possible uses of public waters. (R. 741-47) And it stated that until the Utah
Supreme Court "revisits the scope of Article XVII, Section 1, Adams remains good
law." (R. 747) The district court ignored the fact that Adams, like the other preJ.J.N.P. Co. v. State decisions of this court, dealt with traditional appropriative

uses of public waters. See e.g. Chandler v. Utah Copper Co., 135 P. 106, 109 (Utah
5 Ruling and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, May 21,
2012, R. 729, attached as Addendum E.
9
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1913); Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 205 P.2d 255 (Utah 1949); see also VRA Opening
Brief, p. 19. None deal with recreational uses.
This reading of Article XVII, Section 1 is erroneous as a matter of grammar
and history. Article XVII, Section 1 states, "All existing rights to the use of any of
the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized
and confirmed." (Emphasis added.) This language refers to the location of the

waters, not their ownership, as we demonstrate below. This court need not go
beyond the plain language of the constitutional provision to declare that HB 141
does not violate Article XVII, Section 1. State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93, ,-r 4, 100 P.3d
1218 (courts "look first to the plain meaning of the constitutional provision" and
do "not inquire beyond the plain meaning ... unless [they] find it ambiguous")
(citations omitted).
Article XVII, Section 1 "recognized and confirmed" then-existing rights to
the use of the waters in Utah. As reflected throughout the 1895 Constitutional
Convention debates over Article XVII, Section 1, the provision was designed to
"appease the apprehension" or "appease the unsettled feeling" of farmers who
wanted some assurance that their title to irrigation water would not transfer to
the state upon statehood. (Addendum C, pp. 1207, 1209-10)6 Those debating the
provision argued that Article XVII, Section 1"would be harmless," perhaps even

6 Addendum C was originally Exhibit A to the Alliances first brief as
referenced in footnote 1.
10
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"wholly unnecessary," because vested rights could not be disturbed by the
advent of statehood. (Id. at 1207, 1209) Much of the debate centered upon
whether the provision was necessary at all. (Id. at 1207-10; Addendum D at 1233)7
The next day during the final reading of Article XVII, Section 1, Mr. Coray
moved to strike the provision because it was "perfectly worthless." (Addendum
D at 1233) In defense of the provision, Mr. Maloney explained that "this is a
constitutional recognition of existing rights." (Id.) In the face of further argument
that the provision was unnecessary, Mr. Thoreson explained that "the irrigators
throughout this Territory are asking that something be inserted in the
Constitution acknowledging the rights that they paid so dearly for and which
they prize so much." (Id.) Mr. Thatcher then explained that the provision "can do
no harm," but with its inclusion in the Constitution "the farmers will know that
this Convention wished them to retain acquired rights." (Id.)
To make clear that Article XVII, Section 1 applied only to private rights,
not public rights, Mr. Varian then proposed that "of the State" be changed to "in
the State" because "there are no existing rights in anybody to the waters of the
State- that is belonging to the State." (Id.) The amendment passed. Then, to
make clear that not all private uses of water were confirmed by Article XVII,
Section 1, but only those that fit within the appropriation scheme for allocating

Addendum D was originally Exhibit C to the Alliances first brief as
referenced in footnote 1.
7
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water, Mr. Hart proposed that the words "or beneficial" be inserted after the
word "useful." (Id.) With that amendment, Article XVII, Section 1 took its present
form.
What the language of Article XVII, Section 1 and the debates over that
language reveal is, first, that Article XVII, Section 1 was to protect only private
rights to water. It provided assurance to the uneasy by "recognizing and
confirming" existing rights to use the waters in the State. Article XVII did not
place the scope of the public right to use public waters, especially for recreational
use, beyond legislative control. It only precludes the legislature from any attempt
to deny that vested rights to appropriate water, existing prior to statehood,
survived the transition to statehood.
Second, Article XVII, Section 1 applies only to the right to use waters "for
any useful or beneficial purpose." Putting waters to a uuseful or beneficial
purpose" is how one acquires the right to appropriate water for private use in
Utah. Utah Code § 73-1-3; Becker v. Marble Creek Irr. Co., 49 P. 892, 893 (Utah 1897)
("The great weight of modern authority is to the effect that when an appropriator
permits part of the water appropriated to run to waste, or fails to use a certain
portion of it for some beneficial use or purpose, he can only hold that part of the
water which has been actually applied to a beneficial use, and his right is limited
to the quantity so used."). Article XVII, Section 1 does not encompass uses that
are non-appropriative. And touching a private bed while using waters

12

J _-

recreationally does not qualify as use "for any useful or beneficial purpose"
under the appropriation statutes. Thus, even if the Conatser easement existed in
1896-which it did not-its legislative extinguishment could not implicate
Article XVII, Section 1.
Third, Article XVII, Section 1 is not directed to waters "of" the state, which
would be the phrasing if the drafters were addressing public ownership, but only
to waters "in" the state. As Mr. Varian stated, "there are no existing rights in
anybody to the waters of the State- that is belonging to the State." It is notable
that the district court, in rejecting arguments that Conatser had acknowledged the
statutory foundation of recreational use rights, and relying on Adams for a
constitutional grounding, misquoted the language of Article XVII, Section 1. The
district court cited the article as confirming existing rights to "waters of the
State." (R. 744) Mr. Varian seems to have anticipated the district court's reading
of the provision and attempted to forestall it, unfortunately without success.
The district court's effort to find in Article XVII, Section 1 a public right to
use the waters of the state recreationally must fail. No such public right to use
public waters recreationally "existed" in 1896. And it was certainly not
consciously constitutionalized by those drafting this article. As this court has
stated, that right was "established" in 1982, based on the 1971legislative
mandate that the State Engineer consider recreational uses when judging claims

13
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of interference with water rights. Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 48, ,-r 14, (quoting

I

J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d at 1137).

I

The district court erred when it declared that public ownership of natural
waters was embedded in Article XVII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
3.

The Utah public trust doctrine announced by the district court and
grounded on Article XX, Section 1 departs from the Illinois Central
analysis adopted by this court and creates an unworkable regime of
judicial oversight of legislative function

The district court's unique Utah public trust doctrine developed as this
case progressed, as the brief of VR Acquisitions documents. (VRA, Opening
Briet p. 30) The district court first concluded in its May 21, 2012 Ruling and
Order that HB 141 did not violate the common law public trust doctrine
articulated in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), nor did it
violate Article XX, Section 1. (R. 763-64) The district court then invited the parties
to address in additional briefing possible sources of a broader Utah-specific
public trust doctrine and how the district court might articulate such a standard.
The district court recognized that this task presented "a host of issues of first
impression." (R. 766) This invitation was based on the court's conclusion that
Article XVII, Section 1 protected the public's recreation use of public waters. (R.
747)
Following briefing and argument, the district court issued its March 8,
2013 Ruling and Order. (R. 1093) There, the district court, in effect, created a Utah
public trust doctrine broader in reach and analytically distinct from the Illinois

14

Central public trust doctrine. (R. 1098-1114)8 As will be shown, that effort went

awry.
The district court first explained that the Utah public trust doctrine "is
established in Article XX, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution," (R. 1098), which
provides that public lands "shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of
as may be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been
or may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired." UTAH CONST. Art
XX,§ 1 (emphasis added). It then explained, quoting from that constitutional
provision, that" Article XX, Section 1 is implicated when the State 'disposes' of
public lands." (R. 1099) And it noted that no such disposition had been made by
HB 141. "In adopting [HB 141], the Legislature did not 'dispose' of or transfer

title to all or part [of] the public's easement in waters of the State of Utah. In fact,
the easement exists in public ownership today. Rather, in adopting [HB 141] the
Legislature regulated use of the public's easement." (R. 1099-1100)
The district court could- and should- have ended. its analysis there,
reasoning that because HB 141 does not dispose of the public's easement in
Utah's waters, it does not implicate Article XX, Section 1 and Utah's public trust
doctrine. To do so would have been consistent with its earlier conclusion that the

Ruling and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment re: Plaintiff's
Standing and the Public Trust Doctrine, March 8, 2013, R. 1093, attached as
Addendum F.
8
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Illinois Central public trust doctrine had no application because under that test no

public property had been" disposed of." (R. 764)
But the district court did not stop there. Rather, it proceeded to redefine
the "issue" to be "whether the public trust under Article XX, Section 1 of the
Utah Constitution limits the Legislature's authority to regulate use of the public's
easement in waters of the State of Utah?" (R. 1100 (emphasis added)). Stated
differently, the district court asked, "[w]hether a statute can so narrowly limit
public use of waters in place as to be the functional equivalent of the state
'disposing' of the public's easement in violation of the public trust recognized in
Article XX, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution?" (R. 1108) The district court
determined that this could occur and, in so doing, articulated a new standard for
determining whether regulatory legislation, like HB 141, violates the public trust
doctrine. Under the district court's formulation, a court faced with a contention
that the Utah public trust doctrine has been violated by a legislative regulation
must address the following questions:
(1)

Whether the statute regulates interests protected by the public
trust?

(2)

Whether the public easement was disposed of for the
purposes of which it was acquired?

(3)

Whether the state has given up its right of control over the
public's easement?

(4)

Whether disposing of the public's easement promoted the
interests of the public therein, or was accomplished without
any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands
and waters that remain?
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(R. 1111-12) This test appears to be a logical set of questions, each one of which
has to be answered "yes" or "no" before proceeding to the next question. But in
operation, it is a multifactorial balancing test, one without a predictable outcome.
Having set out its analytical model, the district court next addressed the
first three questions. First, it concluded that HB 141 does regulate an interest
protected by the public trust. (R. 1112) Second, it concluded that HB 141 does not
promote the interest at issue, "public access to and use of state waters." (R. 1113)
As to the third issue, the district court again asserted that HB 141 did not dispose
of anything:
By enacting the Public Waters Access Act, this state did not give up
its right to control the public easement. Rather, the Act constitutes
an assertion of that right. ... As stated in the [May 21, 2012 Ruling
and Order], the Act did not transfer any property interest to private
landowners. "The public's easement in its full scope ... has not been
transferred to private parties, abrogated, or abandoned and remains
in public ownership today."

(R. 1114)
Perplexingly, even though the district court answered its own third
question in the negative, which would suggest the end to the analysis if the test
were syllogistic, it next stated that a disputed issue of material fact existed as to
the fourth question which precluded summary judgment on the question of
whether HB 141 violates the public trust doctrine. (R. 1114-15) The fourth
question, of course, is taken from the test applied by the Supreme Court of the
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United States in Illinois Central, after it had determined as a threshold matter that
public trust property had been" disposed of." Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452-454.
In sum, despite its earlier conclusions that HB 141 does not "dispose of" a
public trust resource, the court gradually developed a broader meaning of what
constitutes a" disposition," ultimately adopting a Utah-unique meaning at odds
with Illinois Central and with common usage. By the time it rendered its
November 4, 2015 Ruling, Order, and Final Judgment, the district court had
defined "to dispose of" to include any "legislative act ordering, controlling,
regulating, or managing public lands." (R. 2642)9 The court ruled that Article XX,
Section 1 "applies broadly to 'all lands ... otherwise acquired' by the State." (R.
2641)
Upon reflection, it is clear that under the district court's definition of
11

dispose of," any action, including a mere lease of public land to a private
II

party," may legitimately be subject to challenge as violating the Utah public trust
doctrine. (R. 2643) Conflict between the legislature and judiciary is likely as every
legislative action to regulate use of public lands, or executive implementation of
legislatively delegated discretion, has a clear potential to give rise to an Article
XX, Section 1 challenge. And that challenge is to be measured by the four
element test the district court created, no one element of which appears capable

Ruling, Order and Final Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff Utah Stream
Access Coalition, Nov. 4, 2015, R. 2602, attached at Addendum G.
9
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of ending the analysis. Any public regulation may be unconstitutional if it is
weighed and found wanting in some balancing of the factors listed.
The last of the district court's four factors is composed of the "substantial
impairment" language from Illinois Central. 146 U.S. at 452-53. That might be
thought to give some comfort, as the Illinois Central test has been applied without
alarm for over a century. However, while the district court adopted this part of
the Illinois Central test, it rejected the threshold requirement the Supreme Court
said had to be met before there could be application of the "substantial
impairment" test- that public trust property had been" disposed of." Taken by
itself, Illinois Central's "without any substantial impairment of the public interest
in the lands and waters remaining" test is vague and lacking in analytical clarity.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. Despite its lineage, it cannot, by itself, carry the

weight the district court assigns it.
Because the district court's multi-factorial public trust doctrine test is not
limited to measures that actually dispose of a public asset, but can reach any
regulation that even temporarily constricts some public use, the final" sul?stantial
impairment" element of the district court's test has no boundaries and, like the
first three elements of the test, is non-dispositive. For this reason, the district
court's test would not appear to permit the grant of a summary judgment in any
case because ordinarily a fact question will be presented as to whether a
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regulation that does not actually "dispose of" a public trust asset restricts that
asset impermissibly, and, therefore, violates Article XX, Section 1.
The Alliance suggests that this court should reject the district court's new
rule and settle on the standard for applying the public trust doctrine that has
been explicitly used in other Utah cases, one that is sufficient to address the
issues in this case. In Colman v. Utah State Land Board, Utah adopted the common
law public trust doctrine as defined in Illinois Central. 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah
1990). That test sets as a threshold requirement whether the public trust asset has
been "disposed of." As has been previously discussed, early in this case, the
district court repeatedly said that this requirement had not been met by HB 141.
• "The public's easement in its full scope as defined in J.J.N.P. and
Conatser has not been transferred to private parties, abrogated, or
abandoned and remains in public ownership today." (R. 759)
• "Article XX, Section 1 is implicated only if HB 141 'disposed of' the
public's easement in State waters .... [T]he Court holds that HB 141
did not dispose of all or part of the public's easement in waters of
the State. Rather, it regulated the lawful use of those waters.
Therefore, HB 141 does not implicate the trust responsibilities·
imposed upon the State in Article XX, section 1." (R. 763)
• "In adopting [HB 141], the Legislature did not 'dispose' of or
transfer title to all or part [of] the public's easement in waters of the
State of Utah. In fact, the easement exists in public ownership
today." (R. 1099-1110)
• "A future Legislature may strike a different balance between
public recreational users and private land owners." (R. 759)
Under Illinois Central, the question of whether a state action impairs the
public trust resource is a nonissue unless and until it is determined that the
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resource has been alienated by the state. Because there has been no alienation of
public trust assets, as the district court found, HB 141 is neither violative of the
public trust doctrine nor of Article XX, Section 1. The legislature has not wholly
abandoned the public trust resource at issue. It retains control of the property
and can revoke HB 141 at any time. This court should confirm that the legislature
had the authority to adjust the balance to be struck between owners of the beds
of non-navigable waters and recreational users of public waters, and uphold the
constitutionality of HB 141.
Conclusion

For these reasons and those stated in VRA's Opening Brief, the Alliance
asks this court to reverse the district court's ruling declaring parts of HB 141
unconstitutional.
DATED this 13th day of June, 2016.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER
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